The Lawfare article is well-written and raises legitimate concerns, but it stumbles by leaping straight from the premise ("geolocation data exists") to the conclusion ("we should ban its sale") without seriously grappling with the costs of that measure.
**First, the proportionality problem.** The article itself cites, as an example of Webloc's use, the identification of a suspect in a serial cigarette theft — a thief located because his device consistently appeared at the scenes of the crimes. The author frames this as troubling, but that is precisely the kind of case where investigative tools should work: real crime, suspect identified, case solved. Criminalizing the tool because of its potential for abuse is the same argument that would justify banning security cameras or phone records.
**Second, the national security argument cuts both ways.** The author warns that foreign adversaries — with explicit mention of China — could acquire this data and build their own intelligence platforms. But an American ban on selling this data does nothing to stop China from collecting it through other means — via its own apps widely installed on Western devices, via data brokers operating in jurisdictions beyond the reach of U.S. law, or via direct collection. Banning the sale domestically may actually weaken America's ability to use this data defensively, while adversaries continue operating freely.
**Third, the proposed solution is disproportionately broad.** There is an enormous difference between "any organization can purchase tracking on anyone without oversight" and "geolocation data cannot be sold at all." The article briefly acknowledges that legislation placing guardrails around how these tools are used by authorities would be needed to protect civil liberties, but quickly abandons that path in favor of an outright ban. Judicial authorization requirements, mandatory audits, and purpose-limitation rules are far more surgical instruments — and far less disruptive to legitimate uses like public health, urban planning, logistics, and research.
**Finally, there is a consistency problem.** The article distinguishes Webloc from Tangles — Penlink's main platform, which aggregates publicly available social media data — arguing that Tangles does not raise the same civil liberties concerns. But that distinction is increasingly artificial. The combination of public data with location data is precisely what makes the system powerful. Banning only the geolocation component without confronting the broader data ecosystem is a patch that does not address the structural problem the author himself identifies.
The concern is real. The proposed solution is not.
The Lawfare article is well-written and raises legitimate concerns, but it stumbles by leaping straight from the premise ("geolocation data exists") to the conclusion ("we should ban its sale") without seriously grappling with the costs of that measure. **First, the proportionality problem.** The article itself cites, as an example of Webloc's use, the identification of a suspect in a serial cigarette theft — a thief located because his device consistently appeared at the scenes of the crimes. The author frames this as troubling, but that is precisely the kind of case where investigative tools should work: real crime, suspect identified, case solved. Criminalizing the tool because of its potential for abuse is the same argument that would justify banning security cameras or phone records. **Second, the national security argument cuts both ways.** The author warns that foreign adversaries — with explicit mention of China — could acquire this data and build their own intelligence platforms. But an American ban on selling this data does nothing to stop China from collecting it through other means — via its own apps widely installed on Western devices, via data brokers operating in jurisdictions beyond the reach of U.S. law, or via direct collection. Banning the sale domestically may actually weaken America's ability to use this data defensively, while adversaries continue operating freely. **Third, the proposed solution is disproportionately broad.** There is an enormous difference between "any organization can purchase tracking on anyone without oversight" and "geolocation data cannot be sold at all." The article briefly acknowledges that legislation placing guardrails around how these tools are used by authorities would be needed to protect civil liberties, but quickly abandons that path in favor of an outright ban. Judicial authorization requirements, mandatory audits, and purpose-limitation rules are far more surgical instruments — and far less disruptive to legitimate uses like public health, urban planning, logistics, and research. **Finally, there is a consistency problem.** The article distinguishes Webloc from Tangles — Penlink's main platform, which aggregates publicly available social media data — arguing that Tangles does not raise the same civil liberties concerns. But that distinction is increasingly artificial. The combination of public data with location data is precisely what makes the system powerful. Banning only the geolocation component without confronting the broader data ecosystem is a patch that does not address the structural problem the author himself identifies. The concern is real. The proposed solution is not.